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East Asian nations are currently undertaking the future development of an economic community by 
creating a viable framework for closer cooperation and deeper integration. However, the intractable 
problem is that there are a lot of diversities and heterogeneity that have prevented the East Asian nations 
from reaching coordinated policies for the promotion of regional cooperation and combining efforts on 
integrating their economies with each other. This paper thus presents that a successful process of 
forthcoming regional integration on the economic side would accompany with strenuous efforts to create a 
common market among ASEAN, China, South Korea, and Japan by establishing a free trade area covering 
the entire region. As the two major countries in the region, in the arrangement, China and Japan would 
have centered roles in promoting economic cooperation in East Asia. However, it is practically impossible 
to decide either China or Japan is capable of taking the initiative in the development without providing 
various rationales for economic cooperation and examining economic challenges facing the both nations. 
In the development,, in addition, Japan’s agricultural policy could be defined as the essential part of 
assessing its regional and bilateral measures consistent with the rules of the WTO, in particular, GATT 
Article XXIV requirements that raise the problem of the concise interpretation of “substantially all the 
trade.” East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 also serves as a catalyst in considering the issues of 
regional integration on the financial side, the principle of which is to sustain an economic recovery and 
minimize the risk of another crisis. The important point is how the East Asian nations foster a regional 
financial framework under ASESAN+3 in which there has been ongoing debates on the development. This 
paper thus discusses possible approaches to enhance regional financial cooperation and provides various 
rationales for developing regional financial schemes while examining Japan’s assistance measures shortly 
after the financial crisis, which became a significant step toward attaining the economic recovery of the 
crisis-affected countries and bringing the financial stability to the region. In order to sustain the economic 
growth in the region, the East Asian nations are currently considering the issue of monetary integration in 
the feasibility of introducing a common currency basket regime that is best understood as the willingness 
of jointly working toward a full currency union. The evidence supports my conclusion, while answering the 
question of how Japan should exercise its leadership in developing regional integration on both economic 
and financial sides, that the creation of the economic community resulting from the common market with 
the full currency union would bring the huge prosperity to the region. 
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I.  Introduction 
     In recent years, a new regionalism in East Asia has been rapidly proceeding on the future 
development of an economic community in the region. Why have the East Asian nations taken a significant 
step toward pursuing the new regionalism? There are the three main factors relating to the world economy 
that are relevant to this issue. The first factor is increasing uncertainty about the future of a multilateral 
framework under the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Doha Development Agenda held in Doha, 
Qatar in November 2001,
1 still fails to reach an agreement for concluding negotiations among the 148 
members of WTO (as of February 2005).
2 The second factor is the strengthening and expansion of the 
European Union (EU)
3 in Europe, and the creation of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
4 
in North America and the enlargement of Pan-Americanism.
5 The deepening and widening of trade blocs 
in Europe and North America caused the East Asia nations huge concern that their exports would face 
fierce competition due to the large markets of EU and NAFTA. The third factor, which is a catalyst in 
considering issues of the new regional integration in East Asia, is East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. 
The financial crisis fostered a new belief that the East Asian nations need to band together so that the 
contagious spread of crises could be minimized by creating a regional financial framework. 
          In order to make the development of their economic community more crucial and advanced, the East 
Asian nations are currently beginning to deepen economic and financial partnership with other nations in 
the region. However, there are so many obstacles to be overcome in the region before such a regional 
collaboration could become a reality. As East Asia is described as the “heterogeneity,” there are enormous 
diversities among the nations in terms of country size, ethnicity, religion, language, social and political 
structures, and the economic development in the region.
6 Compared to Europe, for example, East Asia is 
characterized by greater diversity in term of size, the level of economic development, industrial structures, 
the depth of financial markets, and broad institutional frameworks. In addition, political rivalries, historical 
animosities, cultural differences and ideological confrontation still continue to provide the region with 
 
1 At the Forth World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting held in Doha, Ministers launched a comprehensive set of 
multilateral trade negotiations and a work programme, the mandate of which is referred to as the Doha Development Agenda. 
See WTO Website, The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm.  
2 See WTO Website, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
3 On May 1
st, 2004, the Accession Treaty enters into force and the European Union's biggest enlargement ever in terms of 
scope and diversity becomes a reality with 10 new countries – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. See EU Website, http://europa.eu.int/. 
4 NAFTA, comprising Canada, the United States and Mexico, went into effect in January 1994. See NAFTA Website, 
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org. 
5 Agreement has been reached among 34 countries in North, Central and South America to negotiate for the Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), which will take effect in 2025. See FTAA Website, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/. 
6 Sakakibara and Yamazawa (2003a) pp. 30  2
                                                     
barriers to regional integration.
7 Regardless of a wide range of diversities and difficulties emerged in the 
entire region, however, the East Asian nations are now undertaking its development of the future regional 
integration that would bring the huge prosperity to the region so that they could benefit from such a 
regional collaboration by creating a viable framework for closer cooperation and deeper integration. 
     This paper argues in the two directions that, first a successful process of forthcoming regional 
integration would be achieved in the development of an economic community resulting from a common 
market with a full currency union, and in the development, second, Japan should exercise its leadership in 
developing regional integration on both economic and financial sides. In this regard, this paper is 
organized as follows. Section II, in order to provide the plausible explanation for adding to the plus-three 
nations in the preferential trade arrangements, analyzes an ineffectiveness of ASEAN’s trade liberalization 
scheme that would establish a focal point of the creation of the common market in the region. Section III 
and IV try to compare China and Japan from the perspectives of the positive and negative effects on the 
region, which would serve the blueprint for how regional economic cooperation should be promoted 
among ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan. Section III assesses the potential effects of China’s 
economic growth and WTO accession, both of which bring a variety of implications to the region, and 
identify China’s economic challenges needed to be examined in order to evaluate China’s presence in the 
region. Section IV examines the Japan’s external economic policy centralizing on FTAs and EPAs through 
which Japan promotes economic cooperation in the region, attempts to criticize the Japan’s reluctance of 
opening its agricultural markets, which is a vital element for Japan to exercise its leadership in developing 
regional integration on the economic side, and answers the question of why Japan must accelerate its 
economic and social structural reforms for the sake of the development in the region as a whole. Section V 
explores the nature of East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 so as to lay the groundwork for subsequent 
regional financial cooperation, with a view to promoting sustained economic growth and creating a stable 
financial environment for East Asia. Section VI considers a number of financial issues facing East Asia 
after the financial crisis along with Japan’s assistance measures, clarify various rationales for fostering a 
regional financial framework, such as Chiang Mai Initiative, that provide the basis for a primary impetus 
for the development of regional integration on the financial side under the ASEAN+3 framework, and 
finally attempts to assess significant financial schemes through which East Asian nations would explore 
the feasibility of monetary integration that would be a definitive step toward a full currency union in East 
Asia. Section VII concludes the paper and provides the future prospects. 
 
7 East Asian Vision Group (2001)  3
                                                     
II.  Trade within ASEAN 
     The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
8 has a significant role in developing a 
regional framework for the creation of a common market in the region because ASEAN could be regarded 
as a unique position at the center of a whole series of preferential trade arrangements in the region. 
ASEAN has experienced a remarkable economic recovery after the financial crisis of 1997-98, attained a 
high real GDP growth rate
9 and succeeded in maintaining its economic presence not only in the region but 
also in the worldwide. When it comes to foreign direct investments (FDI) into ASEAN, it is likely to 
gradually increase its total amounts after the financial crisis.
10 These recovery patterns with respect to GDP 
growth rate and FDI into ASEAN could be seen as a basis for continued economic growth and orderly 
economic development of ASEAN. Given these economic aspects, ASEAN is currently negotiating 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements with countries in and outside the region.
11 In the arrangement, 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
12 has been the most advanced and proactive effort to lead to the 
creation of the common market in East Asia. 
          AFTA has three main objectives – reducing tariffs, trade liberalization and attracting inflows of FDI 
to the region.
13 In terms of FDI that is indispensable for further economic growth and development, AFTA 
has succeeded in attracting inflows of the FDI to ASEAN by enhancing market access and creating a more 
attractive market environment with a view to the fact that the enlarged market is likely to attract 
investments much more effectively than the much smaller national domestic markets. It has thus been a 
further stimulus for economic growth. By forming AFTA, in addition, the ASEAN members are not only 
able to provide multinational corporations (MNCs) with an environment where their resources are 
allocated more efficiently but also to increase the credibility of their commitment to trade openness. 
However, an ineffectiveness of tariff reduction and trade liberalization scheme has impeded a further 
success of AFTA. Under AFTA, the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
14 Scheme
15 was set up 
for tariff reductions so that tariffs on goods within the ASEAN region that meet at least 40% ASEAN 
 
8 The Association of South-East Nations (ASEAN) was established among Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand on 8
th August 1967. See ASEAN Website, Bangkok Declaration (1967), http://www.aseansec.org/1629.htm. 
9 ASEAN has successfully attained high real GDP growth rates, after the financial crisis of 1997-98, over 1999-2003 (3.6%, 
5.9%, 3.3%, 4.5% and 5.0%, respectively). Source: ASEAN, Statistical Indicators Table 2.1. 
10 Source: ASEAN, Statistical Yearbook 2003Table VI.2 
11 China, Japan, India and Australia-New Zealand. See ASEAN Website, Other Free Trade Areas under consideration, 
http://www.aseansec.org/13999.htm. 
12 The framework for ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was signed in the Forth ASEAN Summit, Singapore, 27-29 January 
1992. See ASEAN Website, Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (1992), 
http://www.aseansec.org/12474.htm. 
13 Lee (2002) pp. 9 
14 See ASEAN Website, Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(1992), http://www.aseansec.org/12475.htm. 
15 There are four products lists under the CEPT scheme. These are Inclusion List, Temporary Exclusion List, Sensitive List 
and General Exception List.  4
                                                     
content
16 would be reduced to no more than 5 percent by 2003
17 for the original six members, ASEAN 6.
18 
According to the original schedule, all tariffs are also to be abolished by 2010 for ASEAN 6 and by 2015 
for the other four members.
19
     Despite intra-regional tariffs that are already under 5 percent for most items in AFTA,
20 however, 
actual effectiveness of the scheme still remains at a low level. There are the three main reasons for 
responding to the ineffectiveness of AFTA. Compared to other region such as EU or NAFTA, first, 
ASEAN has obviously lower levels of intra-regional trade. In 2002, ASEAN’s intra-exports accounted for 
24.0 percent of its total exports and its intra-imports accounted for 23.6 percent of its total imports whereas 
EU and NAFTA intra-exports accounted for 61.6 and 56.5 percent and its intra-imports for 61.9 and 38.1 
percent, respectively of its total exports and imports.
21 Second, AFTA makes it difficult for the ASEAN 
members to take advantage of its tariff reduction and trade liberalization due to its economic size. In fact, 
none of the ASEAN members’ shares of global GDP is greater than 0.50 percent, and ASEAN’s GDP is 
only 1.75 percent of world wide GDP even in the aggregate.
22 Third, intra-regional trade might not be the 
best measure to evaluate the effectiveness of AFTA. ASEAN’s intention for AFTA is not only to increase 
intra-ASEAN trade but also to make its products internationally competitive by increasing the ASEAN 
region’s competitive advantage as a single production unit.
23 These reasons clearly indicate that AFTA 
could be a more effective trading arrangement by linking to the Northeast Asian nations – China, South 
Korea and Japan – through bilateral arrangements and with the framework of ASEAN+3 that represents the 
entire East Asia region. From this standpoint, the ASEAN members now resolve to promote economic 
linkages among the East Asian nations toward integrating the ASEAN region with the plus-three nations so 
as to reap the benefits from the tariff elimination, abolishment of other trade barriers, and trade 
liberalization scheme in the entire region. It is conceivable that, in the movement, China and Japan have 
centered roles in influencing an agenda for promoting economic cooperation in the region by taking into 
consideration their economic presence. How China and Japan get involved in strengthening and deepening 
their economic relations with ASEAN, and develop regional integration on the economic side while 
dealing with a variety of their challenges facing the both nations are thus critical to foreseeing the future 
creation of the common market in the region. 
 
16 ASEAN (2003b) Rule 3 (a)(i) and ASEAN (2003a) pp. 26 
17 Lee (2002) pp. 7 
18 ASEAN 6 refers to Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
19 ASEAN (2002): The four new members are Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam. 
20 JETRO (2003) pp. 11 
21 Source: ASEAN, Statistical Yearbook 2003 Table I.9 
22 Sakakibara and Yamazawa (2003a) pp. 35 
23 See ASEAN Website, Overview – Association of Southeast Asian Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/147.htm.  5
                                                     
III.  The Rise of China 
a.  The Economic Growth of China 
     Growing at a GDP rate of 7-8 percent between 1998 and 2002,
24 China has achieved remarkable 
economic growth even in the new decade and sustained record rapid expansion in both trade and inward 
investments. China also has increased its political and economic presence due to this outstanding 
performance and thus posed a sentiment of “China is threat” to the region. When it comes to China’s 
growing international trade, China has experienced tremendous export expansion. China’s export grew 
fivefold from US$62.1 billion in 1990 to US$325.6 billion in 2002,
25 making China the fifth largest 
exporter in the world.
26 In the case of China’s exports to the U.S., EU and Japan, it accounted for 21.6, 
15.2 and 14.9 percent respectively of its exports in 2002.
27 Compared to Japan, furthermore, China has 
increased the importance as a trading partner for the U.S. and EU. For example, the market share of U.S. 
imports from China has risen from 6.3-11.1 percent during 1995-2002 whereas Japan has declined from 
16.5 to 10.4 percent.
28 The market share of EU imports from China has also risen from 1.8 to 3.1 percent 
while Japan has decreased those figures from 3.6 to 2.6 percent during the same period.
29 In addition, 
China has encouraged foreign investment into the Chinese market and had opened and expanded the scope 
for the investment by carrying out a series of reforms of its investment regimes.
30 FDI inflows into China 
had grown more than tenfold from US$3.5 billion in 1990 to US$53 billion in 2002,
31 which is now 
overtaking the U.S. as the biggest FDI recipient in the world. In an environment for the economic growth 
and export expansion facilitated by FDI into China, MNCs that take advantage of China’s competitive 
wages and incentives offered through trade liberalization measures now account for more half of the 
nation’s total exports.
32 The economic growth of China represented by growing its exports and imports, 
and expanding inward investments underscores the need for an examination in details as to whether China 
would be capable of taking the initiative in developing regional integration on the economic side while 
dealing with the formidable tasks of reforms in the wake of China’s WTO accession and China’s internal 
problems, both of which have concerned the process on which China develops its economy consistent with 
the global trading system. 
 
24 A GDP rate o China during 1998-2002 was 7.8%, 7.1%, 8.0%, 7.3% and 8.0%, respectively. Source: ADB, Key Indicators 
2003 pp. 102 
25 Source: ADB, Key Indicators 2003 pp. 159 
26 Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2003 Table I.5 
27 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2003 pp. 138 
28 Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2003 Table III.16 
29 Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2003 Table III.37 
30 WTO (2001) para.41 
31 ASEAN (2001a) pp. 4 
32 Yang (2003) pp. 6  6
                                                     
b.  China’s Relations with ASEAN 
          A major reason for the dynamism of the economies of ASEAN and China has been the rapid growth 
of ASEAN-China trade because foreign trade could be defined as an important driving force behind the 
economic development of both regions. During the period from 1990-2000, China’s export grew by an 
average of 14.5 percent, and ASEAN’s regional export was growing at an annual average rate of 17.0 
percent before the occurrence of the financial crisis of 1997-98.
33 During the same period, both China and 
ASEAN also achieved high growth rates in foreign trade between two regions. ASEAN-China trade grew 
from US$8.9 billion in 1993 to US$45.5 billion in 2001.
34 In contrast to Japan whose imports and exports 
share in ASEAN’s market decreasing by 15.0-13.0 percent and 24.9-16.8 percent, moreover, the share of 
ASEAN’s imports and exports accounted for by China has risen over the same period, 1.9-6.4 percent and 
2.2-6.8 percent.
35 The evidence thus suggests that it is clear that China’s role in East Asia become 
increasingly significant. As a result of China’s emergence proven to be a major positive impact on a 
preparation for further economic development, more importantly, it is encouraging that there would be a 
need in an effort to foster strong economic relations between ASEAN and China. 
     At the ASEAN-China Summit held in November 2001, leaders of the two sides reached an 
agreement aimed at concluding a free trade agreement within ten years,
36 and the ASEAN-China Summit 
held in November 2002, they signed the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation
37 that includes an establishment of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA)
38 
under which the deadline for implementation of tariff eliminations is 2010 for ASEAN 6 and China, and 
2015 for the new ASEAN members,
39 with a view to giving the members a special and differential 
treatment and flexibility.
40 This agreement also stipulates a strengthening and enhancement of economic 
cooperation between ASEAN and China by covering a wide range of areas, such as elimination of tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers in substantially all trade in goods, liberalization of trade in services with substantial 
sectoral coverage, establishment of an open and competitive investment regime facilitating and promoting 
investment, provision of special and differential treatment and flexibility to the newer ASEAN members, 
 
33 Source: COMTRADE, Handbook of Statistics 2002 Table 1.2A and 1.2B 
34 China’s exports to ASEAN also grew from US$4.3 billion to US$ 20.2 billion over 1993-2001, while its imports from 
China grew from US$4.6 billion to US$25.3 billion over the same period. Source: ASEAN, Statistical Yearbook 2003 Table 
V.11 and V.13. 
35 Source: ASEAN, Statistical Yearbook 2003 Table V.12 and V.14 
36 See ASEAN Website, Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the Three ASEAN + 1 Summits 
Brunei Darussalam, 6 November 2001, http://www.aseansec.org/2756.htm. 
37 See ASEAN Website, Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of 
Southeast Nations and the People’s of Republic of China, http://www.aseansec.org/13197.htm. 
38 The ACFTA will create an economic region with 1.7 billion consumers, regional GDP of about US$ 2 trillion and total 
trade estimated at US$ 1.23 trillion. See ASEAN (2001a) pp. 30. 
39 ASEAN (2001b) Article 3(4)(a)(i) 
40 ASEAN (2001b) Preamble  7
                                                     
provision of flexibility to the negotiations to address their sensitive areas, and establishment of appropriate 
mechanism for the purposes of effective implementation of this agreement.
41 The agreement also stipulates 
an implementation of an “Early Harvest”
42 program that promotes progressive liberalization of certain 
agricultural items in line with the schedule set out in the agreement.
43 In addition to the cooperation in 
agricultural industry, the agreement is also addressing further cooperation in the areas of information and 
communications technology (ICT), human resources development, Mekong River basin development,
44 
banking and finance, transportation, telecommunications, industrial cooperation, forestry and fisheries, 
energy, and others.
45
          It is expected that there would be significant effects on the economies of both ASEAN and China by 
deepening economic linkages, and establishing open and competitive invest regimes facilitating trade,
46 
however, the framework of cooperation must recognize the difference in levels of development among the 
members who are the least developed countries in order to adjust their economic structures with China and 
facilitating the increasing participation of the members in the framework. In addition, the removal of trade 
barriers between ASEAN and China, which leads to increasing intra-regional trade and economic 
efficiency, and creating a larger market, would adversely affect each region’s domestic market due to 
intensifying competition. Going beyond the obstacles and difficulties, however, the adoption of this 
framework of economic cooperation between ASEAN and China would be successful in bridging the 
development gap among the participating nations, and moving ASEAN-China relations forward. More 
meaningfully, it would establish a solid foundation for the East Asian growth and stability, and represent a 
significant step toward a more ambitious vision of the common market in the region, encompassing 
ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan. 
 
c.  China’s WTO Accession and its Impact on the Region 
     It is also important to note that China’s WTO accession
47 have major implications for China and the 
East Asia nations, and present both opportunities and challenges for the region as a whole. In the 
 
41 ASEAN (2001b) Article 2 
42 ASEAN (2001b) Article 6 
43 See ASEAN (2001b) Annex 3 
44 ASEAN (2001b) Article 7(1) 
45 ASEAN (2001b) Article 7(2) 
46 ASCFTA will increase ASEAN’s exports to China by 48 percent and China’s exports to ASEAN by 55.1 percent. ACFTA 
also increase ASEAN’S GDP by 0.9 percent or by US$ 5.4 billion while China’s real GDP expands by 0.3 percent or by 
US$ 2.2 billion. Source: ASEAN (2001a) Annex 2 
47 China participated in the WTO on December 2001, and the accession of the seventh biggest exporter in the world to the 
WTO is also expected to have significant impact on the international trading system. See WTO Website, Press/243, 17 
September 2001, WTO successfully concludes negotiations on China’s entry, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.  8
                                                     
negotiation of the entry into the WTO, China has agreed to undertake a series of important commitments
48 
and market liberalization measures
49 that have been crucial in promoting China’s integration with the 
global trading system and offering a more predictable environment for trade and inward investments in 
accordance with the WTO rules.
50 Accession to the WTO is also expected to produce significant benefits to 
China in terms of additional economic growth generated by trade and investment reforms that are part of 
the accession agreement. In addition, China’s recent commitments on trade in services represent the most 
significant part of China’s accession package, and would generate enormous productivity gains, otherwise 
China’s services sector still remains closed to foreign competition both from domestic and foreign services 
providers.
51 Reforms of China’s manufacturing encompass the removal of quotas on China’s textiles and 
clothing exports to North America and EU.
52 As a consequence of its WTO accession, China has formally 
been included in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)
53 would eventually obtain 
unrestricted access to textiles and clothing export markets.
54 After the removal of quotas, textiles and 
clothing industry would still face formidable barriers to market access in both developed and developing 
countries’ markets in the form of high tariffs and perhaps safeguard measures,
55 however, there is no doubt 
that China would substantially increase its world market share in the textile and clothing industry 
following the elimination of quotas agreed under the ATC.
56 As a matter of fact, several indicators already 
point to the potential for a substantial increase in China’s exports when quota restrictions are eliminated.
57 
In addition to the market liberalization measures, one more factor contributing to this outstanding 
performance is the high level of FDI inflows driven by the relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing 
sectors from advanced economies into China.
58 Investment liberalization in China would make it possible 
for MNCs to further rationalize their production process within East Asia, such as lowering production 
costs.
59 Also, there would be direct benefits on China’s consumers in the long run through efficiency gains 
 
48 China is given about 5 years to fulfill its commitments. See ASEAN (2001a) pp. 17 
49 These measures, which took place over a 15-year period, have included substantial tariff reductions and the dismantling of 
most nontariff barriers. See IMF (2004) pp. 5 
50 See WTO (2001) 
51 Plans include the opening of key services sectors, where foreign participation was previously nonexistent or marginal, 
notably telecommunications, financial services, and insurance. See IMF (2004) pp. 10 
52 Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003) pp. 10 
53 The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) terminated on January 1, 2005. The expiry of the ten-year transition period 
of ATC implementation means that trade in textile and clothing products is no longer subject to quotas under a special 
regime outside normal WTO/GATT rules. See WTO Website, Explanation of the WTO Agreement Textiles and Clothing, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#cAgreement. 
54 IMF (2004) pp. 11 
55 Acharya and Daly (2004) pp. 19 
56 Nordas (2004) pp. 30   
57 Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004) pp. 11 
58 WTO (2003e) pp. 4 
59 Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003) pp. 7  9
                                                     
and promoting industrial progress that China’s WTO accession contributes.
60 Given the development, 
WTO membership would have significant implications for promoting China’s economic growth by 
enhancing its economic efficiency and promoting its industrial progress. 
     The potential impacts of China’s WTO Accession on the ASEAN members would be identified on 
the following three important aspects. First, ASEAN would increase its access to China’s domestic market 
as a consequence of China’s accession commitments. Second, it would thus cause fierce competition in 
both regions. Third, the possible impact on FDI inflows into ASEAN in light of China’s admission to the 
WTO would be witnessed. These three aspects provide the basis for understanding the blueprint for the 
future economic relations between ASEAN and China. An important consideration for the ASEAN’s 
benefits in favor of China’s WTO accession commitments is that the ASEAN members would gain market 
access to China and thus expanding its exports to China rapidly. However, it is an identical argument that 
there would be increased competition from Chinese exporters in the world market, which is leading to 
great concern about forthcoming disruptive effects on domestic producers. The sectors where the greatest 
challenges are anticipated are textiles and clothing, labor-intensive manufactures and electronic industries 
in which it becomes apparent that China would show its increasing competitiveness in the global export 
markets, and thus pose a more direct competitive threat to the ASEAN’s economies in the future.
61 In order 
to minimize the negative impacts on ASEAN’s economies in the wake of China’s WTO accession, some 
ASEAN members are supposed to undergo significant adjustment aimed at competing with China in the 
export of labor-intensive products.
62 The ASEAN’s economies might also have to adjust to a greater share 
of FDI in the region going to China, and need to take steps to facilitate their own liberalization measures 
and technological innovations in order to improve resource allocation and enable them to pursue their own 
comparative advantage. In the international capital market, in addition, competition for FDI is likely to be 
intensified as the China’s market becomes more open to foreign investment. For these reasons, it is widely 
expected that China’s accession to the WTO would make it more attractive to a large amount of FDI and, 
as a result, it might further divert investment away from other developing countries in particular the 
ASEAN members. There is thus a need to take some measures enhancing the economic relations between 
ASEAN and China otherwise it is likely to cause considerable concerns among the ASEAN members. 
Another important concern is that the WTO commitments by China would not be enjoyed by the three 
non-WTO members of ASEAN – Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam. In addition, the ability of the four 
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new ASEAN members to quickly shift resources to their export sectors to take advantage of any market 
opening in China is likely to be limited. In this regard, positive consideration in the form of promotion 
measures such as provision of capacity building and technical assistance to these countries should be given 
to the non-WTO members of ASEAN in order to expand their trade with China. 
 
d.  China’s Economic Challenges 
     The analysis so far has highlighted the China’s presence, the main source of which is arising from 
the fact that its economy has been expanded rapidly and economic relations between ASEAN and China 
have been enhanced strongly through a broad range of economic perspectives, is open to a primary 
interpretation that China would take the initiative in developing regional integration on the economic side. 
However, it would be suspect to the likely outcome with respect to the initiative unless China overcomes a 
large number of economic challenges and difficulties currently facing China. The main concern is whether 
China is capable of undertaking trade reforms and commitments made as a part of the WTO accession 
agreements that have been critical in promoting China’s integration with the global trading system 
otherwise it might pose huge burdens on China. 
     Regardless of whether it would be great expense on its economic development in the future, as a 
WTO member, China must strictly adhere to all WTO rules and ensure conformity of its domestic laws and 
regulations with the WTO rules so as to fully perform its international obligations. The essential change 
with regard to China’s legal system exists at the center of the assessment of its compliance with its WTO 
accession commitments. In fact, China’s policies and regulations needs to be corrected so that it would 
become more transparent and accountable, and be conducive to creating a favorable and fair environment 
for foreign traders and investors.
63 As the essential component of reforms, in addition, China should 
strengthen the legislative framework of the enforcement of intellectual property rights consistent with the 
WTO agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
64 Significant critics 
have also proposed a wide range of reforms, especially the liberalization of its currency, renminbi. China 
that consolidated its renminbi rate moved to a managed floating rate system in 1994. After 1996, 
furthermore, the renminbi has been liberalized for current transaction, including for imports and exports. 
However, despite consistent dollar surplus which has been caused by the current account surplus and 
inflows of direct investment, the renminbi has been pegged to the dollar since 1994.
65 In light of China’s 
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accession to the WTO and subsequent decision to promote liberalization in trade and investment as well as 
the need to reduce the cost of capital transaction management, it is encouraging that China need to 
liberalize its exchange rate regime in the near future. Associated with these changes in its legal and 
monetary system, China would also face the formidable economic challenges in that there would be import 
surges forcing a number of inefficient small- and medium companies to go to bankrupt by experiencing the 
fierce competition due to the substantial increase in the entry of foreign goods, firms and investment into 
the country in the wake of its acceleration of market liberalization measures consistent with the WTO 
requirements. Also, the challenge to China’s agricultural sectors arises from the pressure of cheaper 
imports and reduction of government subsidies to farmers, which might cause a decline in rural incomes.
66 
Of more importance is to promote reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) so as to be consistent with 
the market economy. The deterioration in management of SOEs has resulted in the emergence of large 
non-performing loans by financial institutions that have provided funding to SOEs over many years.
67 In 
order to enhance the competitiveness of SOEs, China must stop the continuing governmental influence on 
the management of SOEs and no longer directly administer operational activities such as production, 
supply and marketing so as to be determined by the market forces, otherwise the deterioration of 
non-performing loans would be a long-term issue in China. 
          China is also facing increased regional disparity and growing gaps in the income level, which is one 
of the most serious social problems arising from the development process. The acceleration of 
liberalization and competition arising from China’s implementation of its WTO commitments might make 
those problems worse, and it thus remains intractable unless China facilitates the implementation of 
adequate reforms. Income disparity is now rapidly widening between those people living mainly in urban 
areas by enjoying the benefits of the economic development and those people living in rural areas. In 2002, 
for example, the income disparity between urban and rural areas was 3.1 times, and the income disparity 
between the two areas is currently further increasing.
68 Furthermore, the same phenomenon in economic 
disparity has been witnessed between the eastern regions and the central and western regions. Looking at 
the GDP pet capita, in 1991, GDP per capita in the eastern region was twice that of the central and 2.2 
times that of the western regions. By 2001, this gap widened to the extent that the GDP per capita in the 
eastern region was 2.4 times and 3.0 times that for the central and western regions, respectively.
69 In order 
to correct such regional disparities, the government should make a transition from the previous policy of 
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prioritizing development on coastal regions to a policy that focuses on the development of the central and 
western regions, and undertake a policy designed to promote balanced regional economic development. 
Those efforts must include a relaxation of the restrictions on moving from rural to urban areas in order to 
eliminate surplus labor forces in rural areas under the household registration (hukou) system.
70
 
IV.  Japan’s Leadership on the Trade Side 
a.  Japan’s FTA and EPA Strategies 
     With regard to Japan’s trade policy, although its main framework is through the multilateral trading 
system centered on the WTO, Japan began to place high emphasis on a multi-layered external economic 
policy that utilizes various approaches, including regional and bilateral measures.
71 Being free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) important tools for invigorating the 
economy in the global trading system, in this regard, Japan has been intensifying its pursuit of reaching 
economic partnership with its trading partners in East Asia where it is rapidly gaining bigger economic 
presence in the world, and other regions with which Japan has close interdependent economic relations, 
such as Mexico.
72 In addition, it is a vital importance for Japan to further commit to preferential trade 
arrangements in the region when considering the observation suggesting that the East Asian nations 
become an increasingly important trading partner for Japan. Ensuring that all East Asian nations could 
benefit from tariff reduction, trade liberalization, and further inflows of investments and services, there are 
some possible ways of promoting economic cooperation in East Asia. As a means to foster such a 
regionalism and develop regional integration on the economic side in East Asia, the most notable and 
significant means is to create a common market in the region, which would be prerequisite in building an 
economic community in East Asia. In the formation of the common market, Japan should place high 
priority on strengthening the ASEAN-Japan relations as well as the individual ASEAN members. The 
ASEAN-Japan Economic Partnership proposed by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in January 2002 
emphasized its relations with ASEAN. Japan’s first free trade agreement, the Japan-Singapore Economic 
Partnership Agreement concluded in January 2002,
73 could be seen as a prompt response to the 
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regionalism, which reflects Japan’s willingness to take the initiative in the development. In order to pursue 
the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership in line with a partnership with ASEAN as a 
whole, Japan also continues to pursue bilateral measures for the individual ASEAN members in parallel to 
accelerate this overall partnership in that it would not be easy to establish FTAs networks in East Asia 
where there are so many challenges and difficulties to be overcome. From this standpoint, Japan is thus 




77 to conclude economic 
partnership agreements as bilateral measures. Japan is also engaged in advanced efforts to conclude an 
FTA with South Korea,
78 in addition to these nations, which would be a significant step toward concluding 
a FTA under ASEAN+3.
79
     It would be highly effective to coordinate efforts on regional and bilateral measures in parallel 
towards the realization of the common market in the region while taking into consideration the diversities 
and heterogeneity, both of which have prevented the East Asian nations from reaching coordinated policies 
for the promotion of economic cooperation and combining efforts on integrating their economies with each 
other. In this regard, Japan should exercise its leadership in promoting regional economic cooperation 
through economic partnership agreements that cover a broad range of areas, including elements of free 
trade agreements, while assuring that regional and bilateral measures would become building blocks 
toward the overall FTAs networks in the entire region so as to narrow the development gap identified in the 
region. In the formation of the common market, furthermore, those efforts must include principles that its 
regional and bilateral measures would be fully consistent with the principle of the multilateral trading 
system centered on the WTO so that trade liberalization could be achieved at the multilateral level. In the 
efforts to be consistent with the rules of the WTO, especially Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Japan thus should open its agricultural markets, which would be also subject to 
the benefits for other East Asian nations that likely to have large agricultural sectors. In order to bring the 
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mutual benefits in both Japan and the region as a whole, in addition, Japan is also urged to undertake its 
economic and social structural reforms that would lead to the increase in its FDI into the region. 
 
b.  Japan’s Relations with ASEAN as a Whole 
     In its relations with ASEAN, Japan has been engaged in advanced efforts on both regional and 
bilateral levels on the trade side. As a basis for the promotion of regional integration, in the engagement, 
the high priority should be given to an conclusion of both a regional agreement with ASEAN and several 
preceding bilateral agreements with the individual ASEAN members with a view to the future creation of 
the common market by establishing a free trade area under which tariffs and other trade barriers would be 
eliminated or liberalized between all ASEAN members and Japan. ASEAN and Japan have complemented 
each other and could reap the benefits of mutually reinforcing the economic development through strong 
relations in private sectors by promoting partnership and cooperation in a broad range or areas, including 
trade and investments. Japan was ASEAN’s primary trading partner in both imports and exports through 
1980s and before the occurrence of the financial crisis of 1997-98. However, the importance of the 
relations had declined significantly with the share of ASEAN’ exports to Japan dropping to 13.0 percent 
between in 2001, which made Japan drop its position of exports’ share below that of the U.S. (17.0 
percent) and EU (15.3 percent).
80 Despite the structure and changing pattern of trade between ASEAN and 
Japan over the last decade, however, Japan remains a very major and important trading partner for ASEAN 
in the region, in particular, the main import source of ASEAN and FDI inflows into ASEAN.
81 Given the 
background, a process of closer cooperation and deeper integration underscores the importance of ASEAN 
and Japan relations, which have been mutually beneficial for both sides. As a means of developing 
economic integration among the East Asia nations, Japan’s regional and bilateral measures in parallel 
would serve a coordinating function between Japan and ASEAN, and the individual ASEAN members, 
while contributing to efforts of narrowing the development gaps emerged in the region. In order to enhance 
Japan’s cooperation at bilateral and regional levels, in this regard, there is a need to examine the recent 
Japan’s relations with ASEAN in details, represented by the AJCEP and JSEPA that provide the basis for 
Japan’s willingness to develop the creation of the common market in the region. 
          The Joint Declaration was announced at the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting in November 2002 with 
the objective of translating into concrete measures the initiative for ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive 
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Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP) proposed by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in January 
2002.
82 Based on the report of the ASEAN-Japan Closer Economic Partnership Expert Group submitted at 
the consultation between the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the Minister of Economy, Trade and 
Industry of Japan held in September 2002,
83 it is stated that the implementation of measures for the 
realization of the comprehensive economic partnership, including elements of a possible FTA between 
ASEAN and Japan, would be complemented as early as possible within ten years. Going beyond an FTA, 
the AJCEP is also expected to produce various benefits, such as liberalization and facilitation of 
investments and services, protection of intellectual property rights, elimination of market entry regulations, 
promotion of technological transfer, expansion of human exchange, facilitation of the movement of natural 
persons and business people, implementation of customs cooperation, promotion of capacity building and 
technical assistance programmes, establishment of standards and conformance systems, and dispute 
settlements, development of hard and soft infrastructure, securing of markets, cooperation for securing 
stability and sustainable development, enhancement of intra-regional procurements, optimization of 
distribution of production bases, cooperation in individual industrial sector, and improvement of corporate 
earnings performance through cost reduction of enlarged regional transaction.
84 A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  
realization of the AJCEP covering a wide range of areas for economic cooperation, including element of a 
FTA, it is expected that there would be significant economic effects on the economies of both ASEAN and 
Japan.
85 It would also give rise to the free movement of various factors related to economic and cultural 
activities under a more open and transparent environment, with a view to the establishing a future free 
trade area in the entire East Asian region. In order to further deepen the complementarity of ASEAN and 
Japan, and to facilitate economic development, however, there are several challenges and obstacles to be 
overcome. First, due consideration should be given to the different levels of economic development and to 
sectors in the ASEAN members, particularly the new ASEAN members. In order to avoid increased 
competition pressure in the non-competitive sectors, structural adjustment should be implemented in line 
with the WTO rules that allow the members of FTA to take ten years to complete FTA.
86 Second, the 
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establishment of an FTA should be consistent with the WTO Agreements, especially Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
87 and Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).
88 It is very important to promote the AJCEP in conformity with the WTO rules because 
the AJCEP should be regarded as a step toward achieving the multilateral trade liberalization under the 
WTO. In the connection to these suggestions, third, Japan should open its agricultural markets in which 
ASEAN is trying to expand its exports to Japan. However, the argument raised in this context would make 
it still difficult to provide a considerable insight into how Japan should address its agricultural issue for the 
regional development without analyzing the definitive shortcoming in its trade policy. In order to ensure 
whether Japan’s approaches at regional and bilateral levels would be conducive to promoting economic 
cooperation, thus, there is in need of examining the JSEPA that might provide a useful model case for 
assessing Japan’s principles of regional integration on the economic side. 
          As an illustration of Japan’ willingness to take the initiative in the formation of the common market 
in the region, the JSEPA provides a valuable case for understanding of how Japan should address the FTA 
negotiations with the individual ASEAN members. In 2001, Japan negotiated with Singapore the 
conclusion of an economic partnership agreement,
89 and the Japan-Singapore a New-Age Economic 
Partnership Agreement (JSEPA)
90 came into effect on November 2002.
91 Covering customs duties on 
goods representing 98.5 percent of trade between two countries,
92 the JSEPA is Japan’s first free trade 
agreement consistent with Article XXIV of GATT
93 and also provides for free trade and investment in 
services in accordance with Article V of GATS.
94 Going beyond commitments of both countries under the 
WTO on liberalization of trade in goods and services, and investment, the JSEPA covers a wide range of 
key growth areas distinguished from rules of origin, paperless trading, mutual recognition, movement of 
natural persons, and intellectual property in liberalization and facilitation areas, information and 
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communication technology (ICT), human resource development, and small and medium enterprises in 
co-operation areas, and establishment of disputes settlement procedure in general provisions,
95 and thus 
the Japan and Singapore could benefit from strengthening bilateral economic ties in the global economy 
where transactional movements of goods, people and information are advancing. However, whether Japan 
could utilize the JSEPA as a valuable model case for becoming proactive in regional and bilateral 
agreements hinges on its ability to address the major restriction of the JSEPA. Those efforts, needless to 
say, must include the principles that regional and bilateral agreements cover trade liberalization in Japan’s 
agricultural sectors. The major restriction of the JSEPA is to avoid the agricultural issue partly because 
Singapore has basically no agricultural sector while agriculture is a particularly sensitive area for Japan.
96 
The JSEPA thus could safely cover “substantially all the trade”
97 that is one of the requirements of GATT 
Article XXIV for the WTO members entering in regional trade agreements. Furthermore, the Japan’s 
argument that the JSEPA fulfills the requirements of GATT Article XXIV
98 and tariff elimination in 
agricultural products would not lead to significant trade expansion
99 should not be interpreted as a 
rationale for excluding its agricultural sectors in the agreement. In response to the exclusion of Japan’s 
agricultural sectors, in fact, the U.S. points out that “Japan’s schedule contained significant tariff-line carve 
outs and omissions concerned agricultural products.”
100 For these reasons, it appears reasonable to 
conclude that the JSEPA might be limited as a valuable model case for Japan to become proactive in 
regional and bilateral agreements with other East Asia nations where agriculture is very important issue. 
 
c.  Opening Japan’s Agricultural Markets to the Region 
     The analysis so far has suggested that it is less likely that Japan’s approaches in regional and 
bilateral measures, such as the AJCEP and JSEPA, would serve as a coordinating function in the formation 
of the common market in the region, on the grounds that the approaches have failed to address the major 
critical issue for the further development of the East Asia nations. The issue is, needless to say, trade 
liberalization in Japan’s agricultural sectors and tariff elimination of its agricultural products. The question 
of whether Japan is able to exercise its leadership in developing regional integration on the economic side, 
in this regard, requires a more concrete assessment of Japan’s agricultural policy that is a vital element of 
economic cooperation in the region where a number of nations have large agricultural sectors. The 
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important point identified in this context is thus whether Japan is capable of opening its agricultural 
markets, which is a critical issue in the negotiations of regional and bilateral measures. The argument with 
Japan’s agricultural policy is exposed to the two suggestions stemming from its reluctance to lower tariffs 
and eliminate other trade barriers in its agricultural markets; first, Japan should promote regional economic 
cooperation consistent with the WTO rules so that it could become building blocks toward trade 
liberalization at not only bilateral and regional levels but also multilateral level; second, Japan should seek 
to prepare for the tariff reduction and trade liberalization in its agricultural sectors, thereby it would be 
conducive to not only narrowing the gap of the development but also the poverty reduction in the region. 
          In order to complement Japan’s approaches in regional and bilateral measures with the WTO rules, it 
would be a vital importance for Japan to ensure that the preferential trade arrangements in the region 
remain consistent with Article XXIV of GATT that demands that the WTO members enter into regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) to cover a “substantially all the trade”
101 between the entities. For this reason, 
Japan must substantially reduce tariffs and other trade barriers in its agricultural markets. However, the 
interpretation of “substantially all the trade” highlights an ambiguity, which has caused ongoing debates on 
examinations of RTAs, and thus this issue has remained enormously contentious.
102 The Committee 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA)
103 has currently indicated that two interpretations of “substantially all 
the trade” requirement have emerged. One is a quantitative approach that favors defining “substantially all 
the trade” as a statistical benchmark to indicate whether s RTAs trade coverage fulfills the “substantially all 
the trade” requirement.
104 The problem with the quantitative approach is that nations can use this provision 
to exclude the liberalization of sensitive sectors, such as agriculture, as long as the trade volume of the 
RTAs is quantitatively liberalized. The other is a qualitative approach that means that RTAs cannot exclude 
any sectors from the intra-RTA trade liberalization.
105 Under the qualitative approach, “substantially all the 
trade” is viewed as preventing the exclusion of any sectors where the amount of trade was small. As 
identified in these arguments, a lack of consensus on the concise interpretation of “substantially all the 
trade” has resulted in an intractability of the compatibility of RTAs with the WTO rules. In defining 
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“substantially all the trade” in the context of a customs union, the Report Panel and Appellate Body in 
Turkey-Textile Case
106 held that ordinary meaning of the term “substantially” in the context of Article:8(a) 
appears to contain both qualitative and quantitative elements for customs unions.
107 Australia also argues 
that “substantially all the trade should be defined in terms of coverage by a free trade agreement or an 
agreement establishing a customs union of a defined percentage of all six-digit tariff lines listed in the 
Harmonized System.”
108 Australia further elaborates that “such a percentage criterion should be 
established at a sufficiently high level to prevent the carving out of any major sector.”
109 Regardless of the 
suggestions that the WTO members provides so as to resolve the issue in the context of Article XXIV:8, it 
is still controversial whether the concise interpretation of the “substantially all the trade” represents a 
qualitative or a quantitative approach, or a combination of both approaches. In addition, the EU case in 
which exclusion of the agricultural sectors is permitted in the preferential trade arrangements seems to 
reflect an difficulty of the implementation of trade liberalization in sensitive sectors, which would lead to 
further expand trade barriers and thus still create substantial trade diversion and distortion for developing 
countries in which it is likely to have a comparative advantage in their agricultural sectors. As the only 
country that promotes the preferential trade arrangements in multilateral, regional and bilateral measures, 
however, Japan should substantially reduce tariffs on items in sensitive sectors for the sake of the 
developing countries in the region in which opening Japan’s agricultural market is expected for their 
economic growth and the development of trade, by ensuring the consistency of its regional trade 
agreements with the principle of the multilateral trading system centered on the WTO, in particular, the 
requirements of GATT Article XXIV stipulating that RTAs cover “substantially all the trade,” otherwise 
Japan would fail to reach the agreements in the FTA negotiations of both regional and bilateral measures. 
Furthermore, results in trade diversion and distortion caused by an ambiguity of the interpretation of 
“substantially all the trade” would undermine the goals of the multilateral trading system in the WTO. 
          Based on the food security, Japan’s argument that the flexibility be left to the nation that secures the 
agricultural markets to maintain the certain level of domestic agricultural production
110 could been 
recognized as an excuse for Japan’s unwillingness to open its agricultural markets in favor of the 
developing countries in the region because the issue of the food security could be resolved in more 
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integrated economy
111 and, in this sense, Japan should undertake its agricultural policy reforms that would 
be not only essential for the WTO and FTA negotiations but also conducive to the poverty reduction in the 
region where agriculture is the main industry for the poor countries. As an alternative method to replace 
tariffs to farmers who have enjoyed high percent tariff, such as the rice sectors protected by 490% tariff, it 
would be inevitable that Japan open its agricultural markets by ceasing price supports backed by tariffs on 
products and introducing direct income payments to compensate for income losses of farming households, 
who are likely to be affected by reduced prices, similar to those in EU, otherwise it remains incapable of 
overcoming the obstacles in the WTO and FTA negotiations and thus Japan would fail to exercise its 
leadership in developing regional integration on the economic side. EU maintained regional market prices 
higher than international level through tariffs and other measures, and then managed surplus with export 
subsides. Due to the agricultural policy reform carried out in 1992, however, regional support prices have 
been decreased and direct payments to farmers have been introduced in order to compensate them for 
income losses.
112 EU is thus able to supply food to consumers at a low price and guarantee international 
competitiveness while maintaining farmers’ income. The evidence suggests that Japan facilitate the 
implementation of direct income payments to get away with the trade diversion and distortion existed in its 
agricultural sectors for the sake of the regional development even though it is skeptical that the new 
agricultural policy conducted by Japan is best explained as a method of trade liberalization in its 
agricultural sectors because there is a possibility of “loophole” for domestic support payments stipulated in 
the WTO rules.
113 Apart from the possible loophole that might be identified in the WTO rules, the opening 
of Japan’s agricultural markets would bring a considerable insight into another aspect of benefits, such as 
the positive effect that Japan’s real GDP gains would largely come from the trade liberalization in its 
agricultural sectors.
114 Additional support for the trade liberalization in Japan’s agricultural sectors also 
comes from the observation that reduction of trade barriers is also particularly important for the poverty 
reduction in East Asia where agriculture is the main livelihood for poor households in both low- and 
middle-income countries in the region.
115 With nearly three quarters of the world’s poor concentrated in 
rural areas of developing countries and depending heavily on agriculture for their livelihoods, trade 
liberalization in agriculture is crucial to the poverty reduction.
116 In Cambodia and Viet Nam, for example, 
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most of the poor households earn a living by growing rice, and the rice culture spreads over the entire 
region.
117 The trade liberalization in Japan’s agricultural sectors and substantial decline in tariffs of its 
agricultural products, especially rice, are thus indispensable in allow the developing countries in the region 
to improve food security, access a stable food supply, and gain the opportunity to raise income levels 
through their economic growth. 
          In addition to the agricultural issue, Japan is also urged to promote its economic and social structural 
reforms that would be conducive to the development of East Asia through Japan’s FDI that has contributed 
significantly to the rapid economic growth of East Asia until the financial crisis after which inflows of 
Japan’s FDI into the region have been declined. This decline is largely due to unfavorable financial 
circumstance of Japan’s companies and banks, which become one of the reasons for a long recession in 
Japan. The declining trend is likely to be reversed in the near future, however, because a large number of 
Japan’s companies are interested in expanding and strengthening their overseas operations.
118 Facing a 
prolonged recession, many Japan’s companies have found overseas markets attractive by considering the 
overseas production as an effective way to reduce production costs and taking advantage of lower wages in 
these countries, both of which would lead to increasing competitiveness in international markets. In 
addition, Japan’s companies show their interest in responding to local market demand. In the survey of 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation Institute (JBICI), in fact, “responding to expanding markets” was 
the most commonly cited reason for expanding and strengthening operations.
119 As a basis for expanding 
and strengthening operations in ASEAN, Japan’s companies also show their interests in AFTA
120 that 
would cause the expanding trade within the region mainly due to reduced tariffs.
121 These results with 
regard to the reasons for expanding and strengthening overseas production and the expectations for AFTA 
could be viewed as evidence that it is likely to increase Japan’s FDI into the region. 
          An important consideration for the future increase in Japan’s FDI into the region is that critics have 
proposed that in order to reap the benefits from Japan’s FDI, the East Asia nations provide an attractive 
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FDI environment and liberalize FDI policies, both of which could become important driving forces behind 
an economic recovery and sustainable economic growth. In fact, the results of the JBICI survey have 
shown the importance of open trade and invest climate, stable economic environment, well-established and 
well-established soft and hard infrastructure, effective legal system and secured local personnel.
122 In 
addition, the increase in FDI is also expected to contribute to the progress of production technology in 
recipient countries and enable foreign investors to introduce a package of highly productive resources into 
the host economy, including production and process technology, managerial expertise, accounting and 
auditing standards, and knowledge of international markets while MNCs are playing an prominent role in 
the recipient countries by bringing a lot of implications for the countries pursuing an export-oriented 
development suitable for the East Asian economies.
123 More importantly, the critics have also suggested 
that there be Japan’s long-term efforts to implement economic and social structural reforms, including a 
progress on disposal of non-performing loans, financial and corporate sector reform, pension reform, 
strengthening of competition policy, trade liberalization and others, in order to help its private sectors 
revitalize and restore consumer confidence, thereby making an important contribution to sustained growth 
of the East Asia economies and stimulating the development of Japan’s economy.
124
     Thus far I have discussed the most plausible explanation for Japan’s willingness in developing 
regional integration on the economic side. In support of Japan’s approaches in regional and bilateral 
measures, such as the AJCEP and JSEPA, which would become a highly effective method of addressing 
the major critical issue of the East Asia economies, the development gap, abundant evidence supports the 
conclusion that Japan with its strong interest in the importance of a leadership in economic cooperation 
must open its agricultural markets and promote its economic and social structural reforms for the sake of 
the regional development because overwhelming majority of the nations in the region could benefits from 
both trade liberalization in Japan’s agricultural sectors and the increase in its FDI into the region. The 
conclusion contained two elements of the observations. First, the observation that trade liberalization in 
sensitive sectors, such as agriculture, would be achieved at the multilateral level centered on the WTO 
supports the conclusion that Japan’s regional and regional measures should be complied with the 
requirements of GATT Article XXIV that stipulates “substantially all the trade.” Second, the observation 
that closer economic relations with the East Asian nations would significantly contribute to the economic 
growth of Japan supports the conclusion that the factors that have suppressed the Japan’s economy since 
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the burst of the bubble economy should be eliminated so as to benefit the entire region. In order to create 
the common market that would bring the economic prosperity to the region, Japan should be willing to 
exercise its leadership in developing regional integration on the economic side by addressing the major 
critical challenges identified in Japan. 
 
V.  The Nature of East Asian Financial Crisis 
     East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 highlighted the importance of financial cooperation in the 
region. The financial crisis triggered by massive reversals of private short-term capital flows provides the 
best illustration that the occurrence of the crisis spread quickly to other countries in the region in which 
there has been growing regional economic interdependence in terms of trade and investment.
125 The 
painful lessons of the financial crisis have been thus a primary impetus for considering the issue of how 
regional integration on the financial side should be developed so as to minimize the risk of another crisis 
and thereby sustain economic growth in the region. In this sense, there is a need to analyze the nature of 
the financial crisis that could be viewed as the most important rationale for the promotion of financial 
cooperation in the region. 
     The Thai baht crisis spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and eventually South Korea 
within a few months. On July 2, 1997, the Thailand abandoned the peg and thus introduced a managed 
float of the baht, which subsequently depreciated about 20 percent against the US dollar.
126 After Thailand 
devaluation the baht, the Philippines allowed the peso to freely float on July 11
127 and Malaysia abandoned 
the defense of the ringgit peg on July 14. When an IMF package was signed with Thailand on August 
14,
128 Indonesia allowed the rupiah to float. An IMF rescue package for Indonesia singed on November 
4,
129 but failed to stop the depreciation of the rupiah. South Korea was forced to widen its exchange rate 
band in November, which made the stock price and the won sharply fell. South Korea officially abandoned 
its exchange rate band following the signing of an IMF financial package on December 4 and moved to a 
floating system.
130 These events show how the crisis spread from one country to another, and how the 
crisis and contagion dampened economies of the entire East Asian region. In addition, devastating effects 
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of the financial crisis that resulted from the reversal of private capital flows provide a plausible guidance 
why the crisis could be identified as a “capital account crisis” in contrast to the more typical “current 
account crisis” that could be characterized by poor macroeconomic fundamentals such as high inflation 
and large fiscal deficits.
131 As there is evidence indicating that Thailand succeeded in achieving high 
economic growth rate and attracting a large volume of FDI,
132 in fact, the crisis-affected countries 
sustained sound fiscal positions, high saving ratios, low inflations and high economic growth before the 
occurrence of the financial crisis.
133 It could be thus concluded that unsound macroeconomic policies 
could not be identified as a primary factor in the financial crisis. There is indeed observation bringing a 
valuable insight into the nature of the financial crisis based on the case in which the IMF provided 
financial supports for three of the most seriously affected countries, Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia. 
A particularly striking common feature of the three countries was the very high ratio of short-term foreign 
debt to reserves, which became the basis for the reason that the three countries had to adopt many fiscal, 
monetary and structural policy reforms such as increased prudential standards, improved governance, 
foreign access and privatization.
134 Designed to help to restore confidence and sustain an economic 
recovery of the affected countries, in this regard, the IMF rescue packages serve as an important driver for 
igniting discussions on financial cooperation in the region. 
     East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 provides an essential mechanism for understanding of why 
there is a need to create a robust regional framework for financial cooperation so as to prevent resurgence 
of another crisis and attain economic growth, both of which could be identified as key aspects of the 
development of regional integration on the financial side. In addition, the occurrence and contagion of the 
financial crisis gives a straightforward explanation for a support of the new belief that the East Asian 
nations should enhance a regional financial infrastructure by addressing various weaknesses and thus 
lessening the negative impacts on the regional economies that are supposed to be vulnerable to geographic 
fluctuations. Given the nature of the financial crisis, the challenges facing East Asia would be to ensure 
how the nations foster a regional financial framework by developing various financial schemes, including a 
regional financing facility, strong financial institutions, development of bond markets, appropriate 
exchange rate policies, and monetary integration, all of which would be conducive to sustaining economic 
growth in the entire region. 
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VI.  Japan’s Leadership on the Financial Side 
a.  Japan’s Commitment to the Region shortly after the Crisis 
     In order to help East Asian nations recover economic growth and reduce the risk of another crisis, 
Japan has committed to regional financial cooperation through a number of assistance measures for the 
region on the basis for its close economic ties with the East Asian nations.
135 In the arrangement, Japan 
announced Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in September 1997 so that it could bring the financial stability to 
regional currencies and financial markets, and work toward prevention of the recurrence of another crisis 
by making available a pool of funds to be quickly disbursed as a means of emergency balance of payments 
support for economies of the affected countries.
136 However, the U.S. opposed the idea of the AMF on the 
ground that there is a potential for moral hazard and duplication in a circumstance where the affected 
countries could avoid the though conditionality of the IMF and thus receive easy money from the AMF, 
which would undermine an international effort to strengthen domestic policy reforms on the part of the 
borrowing countries due to the soft conditionality associated with the AMF financing. New Miyazawa 
Initiative (NMI), announced in October 1998, was also implemented by Japan as a bilateral support 
mechanism in order to stabilize the regional economies and support the economic recovery of the affected 
countries. The support package totaled US$30 billion, half of which would be set aside for short-term 
capital needs during economic restructuring and reforms, and the rest of which was earmarked for 
medium- and long-term reforms.
137 Although the NMI was implemented shortly after Japan’s unsuccessful 
attempt to form the AMF, the distinction between the two assistance measures is that the AMF was a 
multilateral scheme focused on the stabilization of currency as opposed to the NMI serving as a bilateral 
initiative for recovery assistance.
138 The idea of the AMF was dropped, however, in November 1997, the 
East Asian nations, together with the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, agreed to establish the 
Manila Framework Group, the object of which is to develop a concerted framework for regional financial 
cooperation in order to restore and enhance the prospects for financial stability in the region, and its 
initiatives include the establishment of a new mechanism for regional surveillance to complement global 
surveillance by the IMF; enhancement of economic and technical cooperation, particularly in strengthening 
domestic financial systems and regulatory capacities; strengthening the IMF’s capacity to respond to 
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financial crises; and development of a cooperative financing arrangement for the region to complement 
IMF resources.
139
     Since the occurrence of the financial crisis, Japan has played a leading role in responding to the 
crisis and contributed to prevention of the capital account crisis. The assistance measures announced by 
Japan have thus had important implications for subsequent establishment of a well-designed regional 
financial framework through which the East Asian nations could benefit from the economic recovery, 
reduction of another crisis, and stability of currency and financial systems. Apart from the measures to 
stabilize the East Asian economies, in addition, initiatives implemented by Japan with the objective of 
preventing currency crises also help stabilize Japan’s economy by reducing currency exchange-related risk 
in trade and capital transactions. In order to promote the restructuring of financial sectors, foster a regional 
financial facility, and thus ensure the financial stability in East Asia, Japan should vigorously promote 
regional financial cooperation together with other ASEAN+3 countries. As a first step toward establishing 
a robust financial framework in the region, Japan’s efforts should be put on the process of enhancement of 
regional financial schemes, the main principle of which is to both prevent resurgence of another crisis and 
sustain economic growth in the entire region. 
 
b.  Going Beyond Chiang Mai Initiative 
     The IMF, the main responsibility of which is to provide loans to countries experiencing balance of 
payments problems so that the countries could rebuild their international reserves, stabilize their currencies, 
continue paying for imports, and restore conditions for strong economic growth through an IMF loan 
provided under an “arrangement” that stipulates the specific policies and measures that a country has 
agreed to implement in order to resolve its balance of payments problem, has been seen as a playing a 
major role in helping economies of the member countries overcome balance of payments problems through 
conditional lending.
140 In the case of the East Asian nations seriously affected by the financial crisis, 
however, the IMF was incapable of enabling the affected countries to overcome their difficulties in the 
economies because of a false examination of the nature of the crisis and regional dynamics. As a result, the 
borrowing countries were required to accept rather tight conditionality that discouraged these 
countries to receive adequate amount of liquidity and precipitated the capital account crisis.  
Prescriptions of economic and structural reforms by the IMF thus failed to help restore investor’s 
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confidence and prevent the affected countries from deteriorating their economies during the financial 
crisis.
141 Reflecting the recognition that the IMF has a limited role as a last lender resort, the process of 
financial cooperation in East Asia has concerned the effective method of enhancing regional financing 
schemes without establishment of a regional financing facility that could play a useful in crisis prevention 
and its management. At this point, the important clarification is to establish a regional financing facility 
that works in accordance with the IMF but only substitute to the IMF’s lending facility so that the facility 
could lessen mistakes that might jeopardize the regional economies in times of crisis. 
     As a regional financing arrangement supplementary to existing international arrangements to come 
out the crisis, Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was established by the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers held in 
Chiang Mai, Thailand, in May 2000.
142 The CMI comprises of two elements: one is ASEAN Swap 
Arrangements implemented in 1977,
143 which is now to expand to all ASEAN members, and the other is 
Bilateral Swap Arrangement (BSA), the purpose of which is to provide short-term financial assistance in 
the form of swaps to a country in need of balance of payment support or short-term liquidity support 
among the ASEAN members, China, South Korea and Japan. The BSA is complementary to the IMF’s 
assistance in that countries drawing from the facility are required to accept an IMF program for 
macroeconomic and structural adjustment. The BSA, however, allows a disbursement of up to 10 percent 
of the maximum amount of drawing without any linkage to an IMF program or conditionality.
144 The 
remaining 90 percent is provided to the requesting member under an IMF program. The linkage of 
disbursements to IMF conditionality is meant to ensure that the major part of these swap arrangements is 
not independent of IMF assistance, and to ease the fears of countries that are concerned with potential 
conflicts with IMF conditionality and moral hazard problems.
145 By the end of December 2003, sixteen 
BSAs had been concluded in line with the main principles, reaching a total of US$44 billion.
146 There are 
currently nine BSAs for a combined total of $18.5 billion that have been signed and several more BSAs are 
under negotiations. In the arrangement, Japan is currently taking the lead in the negotiations of agreements 
with the East Asian nations. As of April 2005, Japan has concluded the BSAs, a dollar-won swap 
arrangement worth $2 billion in addition to the present framework of $5 billion with South Korea, a 
dollar-baht and a dollar-yen swap arrangement worth $3 billion with Thailand, a dollar-peso swap 
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arrangement worth $3 billion with the Philippines, a dollar-ringgit swap arrangement worth $1billion in 
addition to the present framework of $2.5 billion with Malaysia, a yen-renminbi swap arrangement worth 
$3billion with China, a dollar-rupiah swap arrangement worth $ 3billion with Indonesia, and a 
dollar-Singapore dollar swap arrangement worth $1 billion with Singapore,
147 and has stated that it 
continues negotiations with other ASEAN members to build a network of swap arrangements. Japan 
should continue to make its proactive effort to create a network of bilateral swap agreements between the 
countries of ASEAN+3 on the grounds that the development of such a regional financing facility under the 
ASEAN+3 framework is extremely meaningful for the stability of financial markets and the stimulus of 
economic growth in the entire region. 
     The financial crisis highlights the importance of establishing an effective regional financing facility 
so that the affected countries are able to respond effectively to financial assistance measures necessary to 
sustain the economies. In this regard, the establishment of a network of bilateral swap agreements under 
the CMI is considered an important step toward successful regional financial cooperation in East Asia. 
However, further steps should be taken so as to expand and deepen the CMI arrangement. Those effort 
must include reduction of moral hazard, increase in the sizes of the BSAs, and multilateralization of the 
CMI. In order to reduce moral hazard problems, first, it is essential to strengthen the surveillance process, 
improve the capacity to formulate appropriate adjustment policy in the formation of adjustment and 
financing in times of crisis.
148 In order to better cope with sudden market irregularities and meet the needs 
of the potential recipients, in addition, the size of the BSAs should be expanded by increasing the amount 
of existing bilateral commitment and concluding new BSAs among the ASEAN members.
149 Finally, it 
would be very important for the East Asian nations to strengthen and deepen the existing regional 
financing facility by making bilateral swap arrangements under the CMI multilateral with substantial 
enhancement of available resources.
150 Multilateralization of swap arrangements would be useful from two 
perspectives. One is that multilateralization ensures smooth disbursement of committed resources. Another 
is that even though individual bilateral arrangements might be small in terms of the size, pooling them 
together in a multilateral framework could increase the total amount of liquidity available.
151 In order to 
make the CMI more effective and crucial, furthermore, an institution under the ASEAN+3 framework to 
coordinate the financing mechanism of the expanded and deepened CMI needs to be established. 
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Establishing such an institution that operates in accordance with an agenda of the ASEAN+3 framework 
would also facilitate the coordination of indispensable work to develop various schemes for promoting 
financial cooperation in East Asia, such as development of regional bond markets, promotion of 
surveillance mechanism, or coordination of macroeconomic policies. Going beyond the CMI that is 
essentially a short-term liquidity support mechanism in times of crisis, in addition, the CMI would lay the 
foundation for further regional financial cooperation that would be a potential vehicle for future monetary 
integration in East Asia. 
 
c.  Fostering Bond Markets in the Region 
     In order to achieve sustainable economic development and consolidate the remarkable 
accomplishment in the region, it is essential to reinforce a regional capital environment so as to provide 
private sectors with stable supplies of long-term capital. As an effective and feasible method to develop the 
capital environment, the primary focus should be to foster regional bond markets so that the development 
of deeper and more liquid regional bond markets would be an significant step toward reducing the reliance 
of corporations and financial institutions on short-term borrowing, and providing an allowance for a better 
diversification of risk in the economy. 
     There are two types of mismatches that became critical causes of the occurrence of the financial 
crisis. First is the maturity mismatch that is likely to happen in a financial circumstance where the reliance 
on short-term loans leads to an explosion in short-term debt of a country, and there are not enough foreign 
currencies left in the country to support these debts.
152 Second is the currency mismatch that refers to the 
case that banks in emerging market countries borrowed in the US dollars and lent in local currencies, and 
corporations in the emerging market countries borrowed in the US dollars and invested in the assets that 
had cash flows in the local currencies.
153 Related to the two types of mismatches, the underdevelopment of 
capital markets in the region was also an important factor behind the financial crisis in which there was the 
collective withdrawal of global banks from their lending activities in East Asia. In an immature capital 
market where corporations were incapable of raising directly from the lenders, the corporations must rely 
on short-term bank loans to support their business. However, the banks would collectively tighten their 
credit in the case of economic instability, which lead to insolvency of some financial institutions and 
corporations, thus jeopardizing the regional banking and economic systems. In this regard, a major lesson 
learned from the financial crisis is that an effective regional long-term capital market needs to be 
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developed so that private sectors could easily access long-term investment financing. 
     In order to solve the double mismatch problems and over-reliance on the baking sector, bond 
markets in East Asia would server as an important financing scheme for the region because long-term 
bonds that match the economic conditions could reduce the risk of a liquidity crisis. Recognizing the need 
for a regional financial framework for the development of bond markets that provide a better method of 
financing instruments and facilitate a better risk management, there is thus a need to explore ways to 
facilitate the provisions. ASEAN+3 agreed to develop regional bond markets under Asian Bond Markets 
Initiative (ABMI) endorsed at the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting in Manila, the Philippines on 
August 2003, the object of which is to develop efficient and liquid bond markets in the region, enabling 
better utilization of savings for investments, and contribute to the mitigation of currency and maturity 
mismatches in financing.
154 Also, ASEAN+3 have discussed a number of initiatives about the 
development of efficient and deep regional bond markets that would be a conducive for the active 
participation of both issuers and investors. In this context, the following issues deserve to be 
considered:
155 1) provision of credit guarantees through the active use of existing guarantors and the 
possible establishment of an Asian Regional Guarantee Facility; 2) strengthening of the rating system by 
enhancing the role of domestic rating agencies, as well as considering the possible establishment of an 
Asian Credit Rating Board; 3) establishment of a mechanism for disseminating information on issuers 
and credit rating agencies; 4) facilitating foreign exchange transactions and addressing settlement issues 
on cross-border transactions; 5) enhancing capacity building through conduct of market research and 
technical assistance programs for promotion of policy dialogue and human resources development among 
member countries; and 6) examining legal and institutional infrastructure, such as company/corporate 
laws, securities transaction laws and tax laws. In order to further assess the regional bond markets, 
working group have been set up as part of the ABMI on six major areas, such as creating new securitized 
debt instruments, credit guarantee mechanism, and issuance of bond denominated in a local currency by 
international organizations and multilateral corporations.
156
     Well-functioned regional bond markets would serve to prevent the recurrence of the financial crisis 
and make a major contribution to attaining the sound development of capital markets while overcoming the 
double mismatch problems. In addition, dissemination of information about bond issuers and enhancement 
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of bond markets infrastructure would facilitate the increase in transaction volumes by both issuers and 
investors, and thus promote a further development of regional bond markets.
157 However, a successful 
development of regional bond markets in East Asia requires more elaborate tasks of improvements, 
including efforts to provide a variety of bonds with different risk profile, and set a benchmark for the bond 
markets with transparent disclosure.
158 In addition, the banking sectors have played a significant role in its 
underdeveloped bond markets in East Asia. The rationale for this view is related to the particular 
difficulties that the East Asian nations face in their financial surroundings, including lack of credible and 
reliable information regarding companies, severe information asymmetry between issuing companies and 
public investors, lack of corporate governance leading to excessive dependence on inefficient financing, 
and the necessity to establish the legal and regulatory framework essential for sound capital markets.
159 
These difficulties would hamper the development of bond markets in the region. Thus, one of the most 
crucial requirements for the development of robust bond markets is a stable and predicable macroeconomic 
environment. 
     In order to avoid the double mismatch problem in funding, in addition, it would be very important to 
issue bonds denominated in a local currency or at least a currency basket of the East Asian currencies that 
move closely together with the local currency. As a first step in the direction, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB),
160 which is a regional development bank (RDB) in Asia, should be encouraged to play a 
fundamental role in issuing the bonds denominated in the local currency because RDBs have extensive 
experience and expertise in dealing with the particular economic financial features of regions and 
identifying constrains for the effective implementation of the standards.
161 More importantly, it would be 
meaningful to actively explore the issuance of bonds denominated in a currency basket on the grounds 
that discussions on the creation of bonds denominated in a currency basket would pave the way for 
seeking the approaches on monetary integration in the region. 
 
d.  The feasibility of Monetary Integration 
     Arising out of the financial crisis and related to the issue of regional financial cooperation, there are 
ongoing debates on approaches for even deeper monetary cooperation in the region, including 
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macroeconomic policy coordination, appropriate monitoring and surveillance procedure, exchange rate 
coordination, provision of an early warning system, appropriate currency regime, and monetary integration 
in the long-term, all of which would be accompanied with enhancement of macroeconomic stability and  
financial systems in the region. In order to promote economic and financial stability by fostering orderly 
underlying economic and financial conditions, in this regard, the challenges would be to assure orderly 
exchange arrangements and promote a stable system of exchange rage. It is thus essential for the East 
Asian nations to discuss and implement concrete exchange rate coordination mechanism. 
     Before the financial crisis, nearly half of the East Asian nations adopted “managed float” exchange 
arrangements, four countries adopted “conventional fixed pegs,” and two countries were “independently 
floating.”
162 However, the experience of the financial crisis reminds these countries of the fact that a fixed 
exchange rate system or the de facto dollar peg system was inadequate for the East Asian nations that have 
close economic relations with not only the U.S. but also European countries, Japan, and intra-regional 
countries because it is very difficult for governments to de-peg the currency, particularly when there is a 
need to devalue the currency.
163 In addition, the East Asian economies in which there is heterogeneity of 
the economic and financial characteristic would make it difficult for the nations to introduce a common 
currency regime stable with a vis-à-vis a single major currency. It is thus conceivable that, with respect to 
regional currencies, adopting a common currency basket regime is the feasible way to bring the stability 
and sustained economic growth to the region. In support of a common currency basket that is a system of 
maintaining the home currency’s exchange rate to a currency basket with a band, the East Asian nations 
should calculate the components of a currency basket based on weighted share of currency used in trade 
between the East Asian economies and, the U.S., EU and Japan.
164 Reflecting the extent weight of trade 
within various patterns on the currency basket would contribute to stabilizing the effective rate, which 
would result in the promotion of trade, FDI and economic growth in the region due to the reduction of 
transaction costs. In order to avoid a coordination failure when choosing their exchange rate systems, in 
this regard, it is preferable for the East Asian nations to stabilize its exchange rate of the currency basket 
system against the three major currencies, the US dollar: 6, euro: 2 and Japanese yen: 2.
165 By pegging to 
this basket and lessening the reliance on external currencies for transactions within the region, the 
currencies of the region could stabilize their effective exchange rates even when the exchange rates among 
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the three currencies fluctuate.
166 In addition, elimination of exchange rate variability would reduce the 
risks and promote greater international trade while enhancing price stability.
167 What it is clear that, in the 
absence of more coordinated and elaborate efforts on integrating the economic and financial systems with 
each other, it becomes much more difficult for the East Asian nations to engage in the process of monetary 
integration that would become a definitive step toward a full currency union within the region. As a critical 
source of the promotion of financial cooperation in East Asia, however, the creation of stable regional 
currency with robust regional financial framework achieved in ASEAN+ 3 would ensure continued 
economic growth and financial stability in the region. 
     Starting with the analysis of the nature of the financial crisis that provides the most plausible 
explanation for the occurrence of discussions on regional financial integration, as a basis for the promotion 
of financial cooperation in East Asia, there have been sufficient reasons for creating a regional financial 
framework within which the East Asian nations could sustain economic growth by preventing another 
crisis and sustaining an economic recovery. In the development, Japan’s assistance measures shortly after 
the financial crisis, such as the AMF, servers as significant catalyst for subsequent financial cooperation 
and has more valuable opportunities of bringing the financial stability to the region. As support for Japan’s 
role in the promotion of financial cooperation in East Asia, the fact that Japan exercises its proactive effort 
in concluding the BSAs under the CMI that is a regional financing facility essential for the crisis times 
prevention could be viewed as evidence that Japan continues to lead the development of a regional 
financial framework under ASEAN+3 in which there has been various progress in the promotion of 
financial cooperation. In addition, drawing painful lessons from the financial crisis in which the IMF-led 
rescue packages failed to make the affected countries attain the economic recovery and thus restore 
investor’s confidence supports the conclusion that there is a need to enhance regional financial integration 
within the region so that the possibility of risk generated in the involvement of international financial 
organizations could be minimized. Another opportunity to the promotion of financial cooperation comes 
from efforts to develop regional bond markets in which issuance of bonds denominated in a currency 
basket has been considered as the best equipment for exploring the feasibility of monetary integration in 
East Asia. Requiring a more complex effort on the promotion of financial cooperation in the region, though, 
it already suffices to note that there are a number of bases for the claim that the East Asian nations are 
currently making great progress in developing regional financial integration, a final goal of which is to 
realize a full currency union with monetary integration in the region. 
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VII.  Conclusion and Future Prospects 
     As a significant step towards promoting well-coordinate economic and financial cooperation, there 
are various discussions and debates on forthcoming regional integration. In the arrangement, the most 
serious challenges reflect the fact that the regional economies are diverse and heterogeneous in term of per 
capita incomes, stage of economic development, institutional capacity, economic system and structures, 
and others. Such diversities and heterogeneity create obvious difficulties and obstacles for reaching 
coordinated policies for the promotion of regional cooperation and combining efforts on integrating their 
economies with each other. In East Asia, in addition, it is often said that there is no leading country that is 
essential to develop regional integration. No doubt, Japan-China relations would be the key to regional 
integration. Despite the observation that there are direct competition and fierce political confrontation 
between China and Japan, the two economies are currently playing complementary roles so as to reap the 
mutual benefits. If the two countries are successful in overcoming their differences and obstacles in an 
effort to cooperate in regional integration and build subsequent regional institutions, they would be 
relations between Germany and France that had leading roles in promoting European Integration. As a 
response to the deepening regional integration of EU and NAFTA, and growing the interdependence 
between the regional economies, Japan should exercise its leadership in promoting economic and financial 
cooperation for the sake of the regional development. In order for Japan to exercise its leadership in 
creating a viable framework for closer cooperation and deeper integration, the following points should be 
highlighted. First, how Japan should address the major critical issue while promoting its preferential trade 
arrangements in the region? The basic question in this context is how Japan deals with its difficult 
agricultural issue. There was thus a need to assess the Japan’s agricultural policy from the perspectives as 
to whether the opening of its agricultural markets would become the essential source of developing 
economic integration in the region. Second, how Japan should promote its regional and bilateral measures 
so that they would be conducive to establishment of overall FTAs networks in East Asia, which would 
evolve into the creation of the common market in the region? Based on the observation that 
interdependence between the East Asian economies grows through deepening trade and investment, 
there was a convincing explanation for a successful process of accelerating the promotion of 
economic cooperation enhanced by China’s reforms in the wake of its WTO accession, Japan’s 
implementation of its economic and social structural reforms, and sustained economic growth of 
ASEAN. The experience of East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 also serves a primary impetus for 
developing regional integration on the financial side. This paper looks at the various rationales for financial  35
                                                     
cooperation in the region. Consistent with the observation that there is a need to enhance financial 
integration together with the promotion of trade, investment and other economic measures, it becomes 
apparent that building deeper and liquid financial markets are integral to enhancing financial stability, 
minimizing the risks of vulnerability to future crises and sustaining economic growth in the entire region. 
Going beyond the CMI, in addition, the East Asian nations are now seriously considering the issue of 
monetary integration in the feasibility of introducing a currency basket regime, the composition of which 
would be determined by the US dollar: 6, euro: 2 and yen: 2. Once the East Asian nations adopt the 
currency basket system, initiatives toward a full currency union must begin with a common objective of 
the development of fully economic and financial integration in the region. If China, South Korea and Japan 
together with ASEAN really make common efforts to promote both economic and financial cooperation in 
East Asia, it would not be impossible to integrate the regional economies under the economic community 
resulting from the common market with the full currency union. This future prospect would provide the 
strong foundation for continuing economic growth and more financial stability in the entire region. 
     It was the third ASEAN+3 Summit in Manila, Philippines on November 1999 that Leaders of 
ASEAN Member Countries, China, South Korea and Japan articulate what they hoped to achieve together 
in East Asia. In their Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, the Leaders said that: “They noted the 
bright prospects for enhanced interaction and closer linkages in East Asia and recognized the fact that this 
growing interaction has helped increase opportunities for cooperation and collaboration with each other, 
thereby strengthening the elements essential for the promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in the 
region.”
168 The main purpose of regional cooperation is to strengthen the regional economies through free 
trade and investment to raise the living standards of the people. In addition, the stability of financial 
environments and the creation of effective financial schemes are essential in the promotion of regional 
cooperation to sustain orderly economic growth in the region as a whole. It was the eighth ASEAN+3 
Summit in Vientiane, Laos on November 2004 that Leaders of ASEAN Member Countries, China, South 
Korea and Japan agreed to convene the first East Asian Summit (EAS) in Malaysia in 2005.
169 The EAS 
would contribute to creating a common understanding in East Asia by addressing the issue of regional 
integration from various angles. This is the moment when the East Asian nations to come together to 
explore and participate in regional integration with a common conviction while tackling with so many 
challenges. It is because it would lay the foundation for the huge prosperity to the East Asian region. 
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